An Out-Of-Bounds Read vulnerability in smbCalcSize in fs/smb/client/netmisc.c in the Linux Kernel. This flaw could allow a local attacker to crash the system or leak internal kernel information.

Refer;
http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=218218

[1] Retrieve WordCount and add offset*2 to the data part of smb
[2] Retrieve a 16-byte value from the calculated pointer

```c
unsigned int
smbCalcSize(void *buf)
{
	struct smb_hdr *ptr = buf;
	return (sizeof(struct smb_hdr) + (2 * ptr->WordCount) +
		2 /* size of the bcc field */ + get_bcc(ptr));
}
...
static inline __u16
get_bcc(struct smb_hdr *hdr)
{
	__le16 *bc_ptr = (__le16 *)BCC(hdr);

	return get_unaligned_le16(bc_ptr);//[2]
}
...
static inline void *
BCC(struct smb_hdr *smb)
{
	return (void *)smb + sizeof(*smb) + 2 * smb->WordCount; //[1]
}
```


[2] cifs_demultiplex_thread → standard_receive3 → cifs_handle_standard → checkSMB → smbCalcSize

```c
int
checkSMB(char *buf, unsigned int total_read, struct TCP_Server_Info *server)
{
	struct smb_hdr *smb = (struct smb_hdr *)buf;
	__u32 rfclen = be32_to_cpu(smb->smb_buf_length);
	__u32 clc_len;  /* calculated length */
	cifs_dbg(FYI, "checkSMB Length: 0x%x, smb_buf_length: 0x%x\n",
		 total_read, rfclen);

	/* is this frame too small to even get to a BCC? */
	if (total_read < 2 + sizeof(struct smb_hdr)) {
...
	}

	/* otherwise, there is enough to get to the BCC */
	if (check_smb_hdr(smb))
		return -EIO;
	clc_len = smbCalcSize(smb);